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When learning order affects sensitivity to base rates: Challenges
for theories of causal learning
Abstract
In three experiments we investigated whether two procedures of acquiring knowledge about the same
causal structure, predictive learning (from causes to effects) versus diagnostic learning (from effects to
causes), would lead to different base-rate use in diagnostic judgments. Results showed that learners are
capable of incorporating base-rate information in their judgments regardless of the direction in which
the causal structure is learned. However, this only holds true for relatively simple scenarios. When
complexity was increased, base rates were only used after diagnostic learning, but were largely
neglected after predictive learning. It could be shown that this asymmetry is not due to a failure of
encoding base rates in predictive learning because participants in all conditions were fairly good at
reporting them. The findings present challenges for all theories of causal learning.
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Abstract 
In three experiments we investigated whether two procedures of acquiring knowledge about 
the same causal structure, predictive learning (from causes to effects) versus diagnostic 
learning (from effects to causes), would lead to different base rate use in diagnostic 
judgments. Results showed that learners are capable of incorporating base rate information in 
their judgments regardless of the direction in which the causal structure is learned. However, 
this only holds true for relatively simple scenarios. When complexity was increased, base 
rates were only used after diagnostic learning, but were largely neglected after predictive 
learning. It could be shown that this asymmetry is not due to a failure of encoding base rates 
in predictive learning because participants in all conditions were fairly good at reporting 
them. The findings present challenges for all theories of causal learning. 
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Acquiring causal knowledge about the world belongs to our most important competencies. 
Causal knowledge allows us to predict future events or explain the occurrence of present 
events. Causal information may be presented in different ways (see Reips, 1998; Waldmann, 
1996, 2000, 2001; Waldmann & Holyoak, 1992; Waldmann, Holyoak, & Fratianne, 1995)(see 
Figure 1). Medical textbooks frequently are structured according to disease categories that are 
the causes of symptom patterns. Students of these textbooks will learn to predict symptoms on 
the basis of diseases. Thus, they acquire predictive knowledge (i.e., from causes to effects). 
However, in other contexts information may be presented in the diagnostic effect-
cause direction. A physician who sees a patient for the first time will check the symptoms 
(i.e., effects) and then attempt to settle on a diagnosis of the probable disease (i.e., the cause). 
Also, textbooks that focus on differential diagnosis typically present causal knowledge in the 
diagnostic direction. 
When a physician knows that a patient has a specific disease, she can predict the 
future symptoms. These predictions require knowledge about the strength of the causal 
relations between disease and symptoms but it does not matter whether the disease is rare or 
frequent. In contrast, diagnoses of likely diseases from observed symptoms are only 
appropriate if both are taken into account, causal strength and the frequencies (i.e., base rates) 
of possible diseases. Thus, due to this asymmetry it may well be that predictive but not 
diagnostic learning leads to a neglect of base rates which may entail erroneous judgments if in 
the future the predictive learners will be asked to make diagnostic judgments. 
Very little is known about the relationship between these two different types of 
learning contexts, predictive and diagnostic learning, and their influence on the resulting 
representation of causal knowledge. The main goal of the present research is to close parts of 
this research gap by focusing on one important aspect of normative diagnostic reasoning, 
sensitivity to the base rates of the causes of the observed pattern of symptoms. 
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The Use of Base Rates in Judgments 
One of the most discussed findings in the literature on judgment and decision making is 
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1973) discovery of base rate neglect. In several experiments they 
have found that people do not adequately take into account the base rates of events in 
diagnostic tasks. An example from the medical domain was investigated by Gigerenzer and 
Hoffrage (1995). In one of their experiments they told participants that the probability of 
breast cancer is one percent. Moreover, if the patient had breast cancer, it would be detected 
in a mammography in 80 percent of the cases. If the patient did not have breast cancer, it 
would be incorrectly detected in a mammography in 9.7 percent of the cases. Presented with 
this information, participants tended to drastically overestimate the likelihood of breast cancer 
for a particular woman with a positive mammography. Students and professional physicians 
gave assessments above 50 percent (Eddy, 1982), whereas the actual conditional probability is 
only 7.8 percent. These results indicate that people neglected or underused the information 
about the base rates and tended to base their judgments on the information about the 
likelihoods of positive tests. 
 However, the stability of the base rate neglect phenomenon has been called into 
question (see Koehler, 1996, for a review). Studies that conveyed the information in summary 
format have shown that subtle variations of the wording of the task may affect the degree of 
appreciation of base rates. Tversky and Kahneman (1980) had already shown that base rates 
tend to be used more frequently when they are causally motivated. Others have also 
demonstrated that the perceived relevance of base rates plays an important role (e.g., Ajzen, 
1977; Bar-Hillel, 1980; Gigerenzer, Hell, & Blank, 1988). Moreover, Gigerenzer and 
Hoffrage (1995) have shown that base rates are used more often when the information is 
given in frequency format, at least in situations in which all presented frequencies are related 
to an identical and clearly defined sample (Fiedler, Brinkmann, Betsch, & Wild, 2000).  
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Not all causal knowledge is acquired on the basis of summary and frequency formats. 
When base rate information is conveyed directly through trial-by-trial experience people can 
fully make use of it (e.g., Christensen-Szalanski & Beach, 1982; Gluck & Bower, 1988; 
Shanks, 1990; Spalding & Murphy, 1999). However, some studies have found base rate 
neglect or even an inverse base rate effect with trial-by-trial learning procedures (e.g., Gluck 
& Bower, 1988; Medin & Edelson, 1988; Kruschke, 1996). Holyoak and Spellman (1993) 
have suggested that base rates are implicitly used during learning but may be neglected when 
the test question requires explicit use of base rates. Although this factor seems to be 
important, there are also studies showing base rate neglect with directly experienced data and 
more implicit tests (Goodie & Fantino, 1995; Lovett & Schunn, 1999). The present research 
extends this research by investigating further factors that might affect base rate sensitivity in 
trial-by-trial learning tasks. 
Predictive vs. Diagnostic Learning 
 Medical diagnosis is arguably the most important domain in which base rates should 
be used. Physicians or medical advisors who neglect base rates may give erroneous advice or 
initiate inadequate treatments. The goal of our studies is to focus on trial-by-trial learning in a 
causal task from the medical domain, and investigate the conditions under which base rates 
are used. We are going to study predictive and diagnostic learning of the same causal 
structure of diseases and symptoms, and study their impact on the use of base rates.  
 In order to understand our experimental paradigm (see Figs. 1 and 2), it is important to 
note the distinction between temporal order (cue and outcome) and causal order (cause and 
effect). Cues and outcomes are generic terms for antecedent and consequent events regardless 
of their causal description. A cue can represent a cause and an outcome an effect (predictive 
task) or a cue can represent an effect and an outcome a cause (diagnostic task).  
 In the diagnostic learning task, participants will be given information about symptoms 
(i.e. the effects of diseases) as cues and will be asked to diagnose the disease (i.e., the cause of 
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the symptoms). Each disease has a unique symptom that is only caused by this disease (e.g. 
stiff joints caused by the disease ”pleroia” in Fig. 2), and an ambiguous symptom that is 
caused by two competing diseases (e.g. shortness of breath is present if a patient has pleroia 
or spetitis). The base rates of these two diseases vary. To test sensitivity to base rates, the final 
test questions require diagnostic inferences in the effect-cause direction. The crucial test 
involves the ambiguous symptoms (e.g., shortness of breath in the example in Fig. 2). Since 
each of these symptoms is deterministically caused by two competing diseases (e.g., both 
pleroia and spetitis always lead to shortness of breath), the diagnostic judgments should 
reflect their base rates. Given the ambiguous symptom as a single cue in the test phase, the 
more frequent disease should be judged as more likely than the less frequent disease. In the 
example, given only the information that a patient has shortness of breath and one of the two 
diseases, a good diagnostician should assume that the patient has pleroia with a likelihood of 
75%.  
 In the predictive version of the task we will present the same diseases with identical 
causal structures and base rates in the predictive direction from the causes (the diseases) to 
their effects (symptoms)(see Fig. 1). Thus, learners will be given the individual diseases as 
cues and will have to predict the two symptoms that are deterministically caused by the 
diseases. For example, given pleroia participants will learn to predict the presence of stiff 
joints and shortness of breath in patients. In the test phase, symptoms will be given as cues (as 
in the diagnostic condition), and learners will be asked to assess the likelihood of the diseases. 
Thus, in both conditions participants learn the same causal structures with each disease 
causing two symptoms and with diseases varying in frequency. Moreover, in both tasks 
participants are requested to make diagnostic judgments based on individual symptoms as 
cues. The only difference is that in the diagnostic learning condition participants receive 
symptoms as cues and learn to diagnose the associated diseases, whereas in the predictive 
learning condition they receive diseases as cues and learn to predict the associated symptoms. 
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Normatively, base rates should be used regardless of learning direction. Also if the use 
of base rates hinges on the presentation of trial-by-trial information (Christensen-Szalanski & 
Beach, 1982) or on the presentation of natural frequencies that are related to identical samples 
(Fiedler et al., 2000; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995), sensitivity to base rates should be equal 
in both conditions. In both learning procedures participants are presented with information of 
sequences of individual patients, and are asked to give identical diagnostic judgments.  
The comparison between predictive and diagnostic learning in the present experiments 
differs from the tasks used in previous studies designed to test causal-model theory (e.g., 
Waldmann & Holyoak, 1992; Waldmann, 2000, 2001). In their experiments the cues were 
either characterized as effects (diagnostic learning) or causes (predictive learning) of the 
outcomes, thus varying causal models of the same structures while keeping the learning order 
and the test questions constant. The goal of the present studies is to keep the causal model of a 
structure constant while studying the impact of learning order (see Figs. 1, 2)(see Cobos, 
López, Caño, Alvarez, & Shanks, 2002; Yamauchi & Markman, 1998; Yamauchi, Love, & 
Markman, 2002, for related paradigms).  
Competing Theories of Learning 
During the last few years there has been a debate between associative and cognitive accounts 
of causal learning (see De Houwer & Beckers, 2002; De Houwer, Beckers, & Vandorpe, 
2005). Thus, it is interesting to consider the predictions of these theories for our tasks.  
Causal-Model Theory. We will discuss causal-model theory as a representative example of 
rational models of complex causal model learning because it is the only theory that has 
addressed the differences between predictive and diagnostic learning so far (but see Gopnik, 
Glymour, Sobel, Schulz, Kushnir, & Danks, 2004, for a related theory). Causal-model theory 
assumes that learners form a representation of causal models regardless of the order in which 
learning information is presented. These causal models contain information about how causes 
are related to effects (i.e., causal structure) along with estimates about the parameters (e.g., 
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causal strength, base rates) that are gleaned from the learning data. It is typically assumed that 
the parameters are estimated on the basis of the observed frequencies in the learning data 
(Waldmann & Holyoak, 1992; Waldmann & Hagmayer, 2005).  
The focus of the present experiments is the use of base rates in diagnostic judgments. 
The predictive learning condition is the most interesting condition for testing causal-model 
theory because in this condition the task at test is directed in the opposite direction to learning 
order. In this condition participants are required to switch from predictive learning to 
diagnostic judgments. Only if learners correctly acquire a causal model and its parameters 
(causal strength, base rates), and if they can correctly access the model in both predictive and 
diagnostic directions, normative judgments are to be expected for the diagnostic test questions 
after predictive learning. Causal-model theory predicts that learners should attempt to acquire 
causal-model knowledge regardless of learning order, and hence be sensitive to base rates in 
both learning conditions, predictive and diagnostic learning. In the General Discussion an 
extended version of causal-model theory is discussed that is sensitive to the complexity of the 
task (see also Reips, 1998). 
Associative Theories. We will discuss the Rescorla-Wagner theory of associative learning as a 
representative example of this class of theories. This theory has been applied to model 
sensitivity to base rates (Gluck & Bower, 1988; Shanks, 1990). Associative theories would 
model the diagnostic task with symptoms as cues and diseases as outcomes. Since the 
underlying associative learning rule attempts to reduce errors, eventually the learning model 
would correctly diagnose the diseases. These diagnoses would be sensitive to the base rates. It 
is interesting to note that these models explain sensitivity to base rates without having to 
separately represent base rates. The diagnoses are simply a consequence of combining 
associative weights that are tuned to take the objective base rates into account.  
 In the predictive context, associative models would assign the diseases to the cue layer 
and the symptoms to the outcome layer. In this context the models attempt to correctly predict 
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the outcomes (i.e., the symptoms). At the learning asymptote the model should have learned 
maximal weights representing the deterministic relations between each disease and its two 
associated symptoms. Since outcomes, according to the Rescorla-Wagner and related 
theories, do not compete with respect to their cues, the associative weights are solely 
dependent on the contingencies between diseases and symptoms. Base rates do not affect the 
outcome of learning, at least at the asymptotic stage.  
 What would these models predict for the diagnostic judgments? Since our test phase 
requires assessments opposite to the learning direction (from outcomes to cues), additional 
assumptions need to be made. A simple assumption would be that people use the associative 
weights from the learning task also in this phase. In this case associative theories would 
predict base rate sensitivity after diagnostic but not after predictive learning. Possible 
extensions of this basic account and alternative theories will be discussed in the General 
Discussion.  
 One interesting empirical question will be whether participants encode the frequencies 
of the causes even when they are ignored in the actual diagnoses. In the predictive learning 
context the task does not require an encoding of frequencies. However, it has been argued that 
frequencies often are encoded automatically (Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Reber, 1993). Whereas 
causal-model theory assumes that people use conditional frequency information to arrive at 
inferences (Waldmann & Holyoak, 1992), the Rescorla-Wagner model does not predict 
storage of frequency information. It may also happen that people store the base rates but do 
not use them in their judgments. If that was the case, an underuse of base rates would support 
the notion that base rate neglect in our task is not a consequence of a failure to encode 
frequency information during learning but rather a consequence of the fact that participants 
did not embody base rates in the trial-by-trial judgment procedures. Frequencies may be 
stored passively but still not used in the diagnoses. This finding would place further 
constraints on theories of causal learning.  
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Experiment 1 
The first experiment is designed to test whether learners have the competency of correctly 
incorporating base rate information regardless of the sequence of learning. This competency 
is predicted by causal-model theory, but would be at odds with associative theories. To test 
this hypothesis, participants in the predictive and the diagnostic learning conditions received 
identical learning materials that contained information about two different diseases (causes) 
and their three associated symptoms (effects). The only difference in the learning phase was 
that participants in the predictive condition received information about the diseases as cues 
and had to learn to predict symptoms as outcomes, whereas in the diagnostic condition 
learners received information about the symptoms first as cues and had to learn to diagnose 
the diseases. After the learning phase all participants were requested to give assessments of 
the probability of the diseases given information about the presence of individual symptoms. 
Accordingly, the test phase was directed in the diagnostic direction from effect cues to their 
causes.  
To test whether participants were sensitive to base rates we used a causal structure 
(“M-structure”) in which each disease had two symptoms, one of which was unique for the 
disease. The other symptom was shared with a second disease and thus ambiguous (see Fig. 
2). All symptoms were deterministically caused by the associated diseases. We varied the 
base rates of the two diseases that competed for the explanation of the ambiguous symptom 
(see Medin & Edelson, 1988, for a similar task). Base rate sensitivity implies that participants 
would give the more frequent disease a higher probability than the rare disease when the 
ambiguous symptom is present.  
Participants and Design 
There were 24 participants, all students from the University of Tübingen, who received either 
participation credit or DM 5. Half of this group was randomly assigned to either of the two 
learning conditions, predictive or diagnostic learning.   
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Material  
Instructions and learning trials in all experiments were presented in German. As symptoms we 
used stiff joints, shortness of breath, and muscle cramps. The fictitious diseases were 
“pleroia” (frequent) and “spetitis” (rare).  The role of each symptom as either a unique or an 
ambiguous cues was counterbalanced. The order of trials was randomized within blocks, with 
each block representing a complete M structure.  
 The causal “M-structure” underlying the learning material was constructed as follows 
(see Fig. 2): There are two diseases and three symptoms. Each disease deterministically 
causes two symptoms. One of these two symptoms is ambiguous  in that it is an effect of 
either diseases, while the other two symptoms are each caused by one disease only (i.e., 
unique symptoms). For example, the disease pleroia causes both stiff joints and shortness of 
breath, and the disease spetitis causes the symptoms shortness of breath and muscle cramps. 
Thus, shortness of breath is the ambiguous symptom because it does not allow to decide 
between the diagnoses pleroia and spetitis. Base rates were manipulated in a 3:1 ratio, 
meaning that one disease within the M-structure was three times as frequent as the other 
disease. In the experiment participants saw 24 times the frequent disease and its associated 
symptoms on individual index cards, and 8 times the rare disease and its associated 
symptoms. 
Dependent measures 
Our data analysis in all experiments focuses on diagnostic decisions based on the ambiguous 
symptoms because only these are indicators of base rate use. Base rate sensitivity implies that 
the more frequent disease is seen as a more probable cause than the rare disease when an 
ambiguous symptom is present and no other information is available. Sensitivity to base rates 
is indicated when participants give a higher probability rating for the frequent disease than for 
the rare disease when confronted with the ambiguous symptom that is deterministically 
caused by either disease. Thus, we generally defined base rate use as the difference between 
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participants’ ratings or proportion of choices of the frequent disease minus their ratings or 
proportion of choices of the rare disease. If applicable, the differences were averaged over all 
causal structures (see Experiments 2 and 3), resulting in the measure of base rate use. If the 
measure takes a positive value, it indicates base rate use, if it is zero it indicates no base rate 
use. Negative values would show a reversed use of base rates.  
Procedure 
Participants were run individually. Before going through the learning trials participants 
received typed instructions (in German). To facilitate thorough reading of the instructions all 
participants were told that they would be asked to summarize the written instructions once 
having read through them. Participants were asked by the experimenter to re-read the 
instructions whenever their oral summary indicated a misunderstanding of the instructions. In 
the instructions, all participants were asked to imagine being a guest in a special clinic for 
viro-neuronal tropical diseases for one day. Participants in the diagnostic learning condition 
were told that they would be learning to diagnose diseases, and that their task was to diagnose 
patients’ diseases based on information about the symptoms these patients exhibited. 
Participants in the predictive learning condition were told that they were going to learn to 
predict symptoms, and that their task was to predict patients’ symptoms on the basis of 
information about the disease on the patients' cards. After summarizing the instructions, 
participants began with the learning task. Descriptions of patients were presented by the 
experimenter, one by one, on 32 index cards. Each card displayed two symptoms on one side 
and one disease on the other side. The cards were presented in blocks of four trials, each 
block containing all trials for the base rate distribution within the M-structure. Card order was 
randomized within each block. The participants in the diagnostic learning condition were 
shown the side with the symptoms first. After having announced the diagnosis, learners were 
shown the back of the card, which showed the patient's disease. The participants in the 
predictive learning condition were presented the side with the disease first. After having 
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announced the prediction they were shown the back of the card, which showed the patient's 
symptoms. Figure 3 shows a schematic description of the procedure used. 
After the learning phase, participants were handed typed sheets with rating 
instructions and rating scales. In the instructions participants were told to imagine receiving 
information about the next patient arriving at the clinic. Then it was pointed out that in this 
phase participants would only receive information about a single symptom of the patient. The 
task was to rate the probability of the patient having the respective disease on a scale ranging 
from very improbable (0) to very probable (100). Thus, participants were asked to give ratings 
of the diagnostic relation between individual symptoms and the diseases.1 In addition to the 
ratings, we asked participants to make a forced choice between the diseases in the presence of 
each of the symptoms. We also asked participants to give relative frequency estimates for the 
diseases on a scale from 0 to 100 percent. 
Results and Discussion 
We conducted an ANOVA with the average differences between probability ratings for the 
two diseases in the ambiguous symptoms’ presence. The explicit measure of base rate use was 
not significantly different for causal learning direction, F(1, 22)=0.41, MSE=1023.49, n.s. 
(see Fig. 4). The means of the measure of base rate use were 18 (SD=29) in the diagnostic 
learning condition and 26 (SD=35) in the predictive learning condition. In both learning 
conditions there was clear evidence for base rate use, meaning that the mean probability 
ratings for the more frequent disease were higher than for the less frequent disease. 
In sum, Experiment 1 shows roughly equal amounts of base rate appreciation after 
predictive and diagnostic learning (see Figure 4). In the diagnostic learning condition there 
were four and in the predictive learning condition there were five participants who made use 
of the base rate information. No one gave a higher rating for the rare as compared to the 
frequent disease. The analysis of the forced choice data also revealed a complete lack of an 
asymmetry between the conditions. The same number (9) of participants in both causal 
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conditions chose the frequent disease when confronted with a patient showing the ambiguous 
symptom.  
The ratings for frequencies of the diseases also turned out to be similar in both causal 
conditions (see Fig. 5). An analysis of variance on the differences between the average 
frequency ratings for the frequent diseases versus the rare diseases with the factor causal 
learning direction as the independent variable showed no statistically significant difference, 
F(1, 22)=0.01, MSE=448.11, n.s. The average means for differences were 48 (SD=24) in the 
diagnostic learning condition and 49 (SD=17) in the predictive learning condition. The main 
effect between the learning conditions was not significant. Thus, participants appeared to 
encode frequency information regardless of learning direction. 
In the present experiment participants tended to be equally sensitive to base rates in 
both the diagnostic and the predictive learning conditions even though the predictive learning 
task does not require this sensitivity to achieve error free performance. The results are 
consistent with the predictions of causal-model theory but are at odds with the Rescorla-
Wagner theory and related models. Further evidence for a non-associative account is the fact 
that learners were aware of the different base rates of the diseases in their frequency 
judgments.  
The results of the present experiment are consistent with our previous research 
supporting causal-model theory, which showed that learners try to correctly represent causal 
knowledge regardless of the sequence of the learning input (Waldmann & Holyoak, 1992; 
Waldmann, 1996, 2000, 2001). Whereas previous experiments have demonstrated this skill in 
tasks in which cues and outcomes were kept constant while varying the underlying causal 
model, the current experiment provides the first evidence for the competency to correctly 
learn about identical causal models irrespective of the sequence in which the elements of the 
models are experienced.  
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Experiment 2 
Experiment 1 demonstrated sensitivity to base rates irrespective of learning order. This 
finding is consistent with causal-model theory, which claims that people attempt to form 
adequate representations of causal models regardless of the order in which knowledge is 
acquired (see Waldmann, 1996; Lagnado, Waldmann, Hagmayer, & Sloman, in press). With 
Experiments 2 and 3 we pursued the goal to investigate the boundary conditions of this 
competency. Previous research has shown that the competency to acquire knowledge about 
causal models can break down when complexity of the domain or the task is increased (De 
Houwer & Beckers, 2003; Reips, 1998; Waldmann & Walker, 2005). We therefore increased 
the complexity of the task by increasing the number of diseases and symptoms.2 In 
Experiment 2 we presented a task with six diseases and nine symptoms (triple M-structure). 
As in Experiment 1, one of the two diseases within each M-structure and its symptoms was 
presented three times as frequent as the other disease within that structure.  
 We generally expected that the more difficult condition in which learning order and 
test order mismatch (predictive learning) should be particularly prone to performance deficits. 
Adequate learning of causal models requires the acquisition of knowledge of the structure and 
of the size of the parameters. A plausible strategy used by learners under taxing conditions 
might be to abandon the goal to form complete causal model representations that can be 
flexibly accessed, and fall back on learning only the information that is necessary to minimize 
errors in the current task (see also Lovett and Schunn, 1999). Reducing errors in diagnostic 
learning requires the diagnoses to be tuned to base rates; therefore we expected sensitivity to 
base rates in this condition. In contrast, predictive learning does not require sensitivity to base 
rates. In this condition, learners predict symptoms on the basis of more or less frequent 
diseases. Whereas diseases compete for explaining symptoms, there is no competition 
between symptoms that would require learners to take into account base rate information. 
Thus, learners in the predictive condition may correctly acquire the knowledge about the 
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structure of the causal models (i.e., M-structures with deterministic relations) but reduce the 
learning effort by ignoring parameters, such as the unequal base rates, that are currently not 
relevant for successful performance.  
 An interesting empirical question will be whether participants encode the frequencies 
of the diseases even when they are ignored in the diagnostic estimates. Whereas standard 
associative theories would not predict an encoding of frequency information, probabilistic 
theories (including causal-model theory) assume storage of frequencies. The potential 
dissociation between storage and use of base rates after predictive learning would place 
important constraints on theories.  
Method 
Participants and Design. There were 32 participants, mostly students from the 
University of Tübingen, who were recruited in the university cafeteria. They either received 
participation credit or were paid DM 8. Participants were randomly assigned to either the 
diagnostic learning condition or the predictive learning condition. 
Material and Procedure. The most important difference to Experiment 1 was that we 
presented three M-structures instead of one, with six diseases (“terrigitis”, “spetitis”, “rutix”, 
“pleroia”, “bilea”, “althrax”) and nine symptoms (irritant cough, ear-ache, muscle cramps, hot 
flushes, skin rash, pain in the limbs, stiff joints, eye irritation, shortness of breath). As in 
Experiment 1 each disease deterministically caused one unique and one ambiguous symptom. 
The relative base rates of the two competing diseases were the same as in Experiment 1 (3:1); 
the names of diseases were randomly assigned to the base rates. Moreover, the nine symptoms 
were randomly assigned to the six diseases.  
The learning trials were presented on a computer monitor using the Micro 
Experimental Laboratory (MEL) software. Except for the different frequency judgment scales 
(see below), participants received the same instructions and rating scales as in the first 
experiment, with an additional instruction on how to use the computer, and two new types of 
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questionnaires. Participants were informed that they would receive patient information on the 
computer. Each new display on the computer screen would represent one patient who had just 
been hospitalized. Then participants were instructed that the speed of the experiment would 
be self-paced: The experimenter would press the button to display the label of the disease and 
the symptoms of a patient only after the participant's verbal answer to a trial. The sequence of 
information was similar to the procedure in Experiment 1, which means that disease 
information was presented first in the predictive learning condition and symptom information 
first in the diagnostic learning condition. The next patient's information would be displayed 
only after the participant had studied the feedback and had said “ok” or “continue” or similar. 
In order to reduce task difficulty two sheets of paper that listed all possible diseases and 
symptoms were on display throughout the experiment. We set a learning criterion of two 
completely correctly answered blocks with a minimum of 48 trials and a maximum of 192 
trials (which nobody reached). In addition to the ratings, we asked participants to make a 
forced choice between the diseases in the presence of each of the symptoms. The order of 
symptoms on the response sheets was randomized. Furthermore, we asked participants how 
frequent the diseases were, on a rating scale with the endpoints 1 (“very rare”) and 7 (“very 
frequent”).  
Results and Discussion 
The average means of ratings of the probability of the high frequency diseases conditional 
upon the ambiguous symptom were similar in the causal conditions. They were 63% (SD=25) 
after diagnostic learning and 61% (SD=20) after predictive learning. For the low base rate 
diseases, however, participants in the diagnostic condition rated the probability on average at 
36% (SD=18), while the respective value in the predictive learning condition turned out to be 
64% (SD=23)(see Fig. 6). 
As in Experiment 1, we conducted an analysis of variance on the measure of base rate 
use, that is the difference between probability ratings for the two diseases in the ambiguous 
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symptom’s presence, averaged over all M-structures. In the present experiment with the more 
complex causal structure the measure of base rate use was significantly different in the two 
contrasting conditions, F(1, 30)=11.93, MSE=612.08, p<.01. Base rate appreciation was 
higher after diagnostic learning (M=27, SD=29) than after predictive learning (M=-3, SD=19) 
following the learning of the triple M-structure. Only four out of 16 participants in the 
diagnostic learning condition gave ratings inconsistent with base rate use (three equal, one 
higher for the infrequent cause), in contrast to 13 out of 16 in the predictive learning condition 
(eight equal, five higher for the infrequent cause).  
 In contrast to the probability estimates, the analysis of the forced choice data revealed 
no asymmetry between the conditions. A Kruskal-Wallis test on the differences between the 
number of choices of the frequent diseases and of the rare diseases showed no statistically 
significant difference for causal learning direction, χ2(1, N=31)=0.34, n.s. (one participant did 
not fill out the choice questionnaire). Probably the choice measure is less sensitive to 
differences in the strength of base rate sensitivity than the probability measure because people 
might choose the more frequent disease even when they believe that the probabilities of the 
frequent and the rare disease are very close. 
Ratings for frequencies of diseases again turned out to be similarly accurate in both 
causal conditions (see Fig. 7). An analysis of variance on the differences between the average 
frequency ratings for the frequent diseases versus the rare diseases with the factor causal 
learning direction as the independent variable showed no statistically significant difference, 
F(1, 30)=0.47, MSE=1.26, n.s. The average means for differences were 2.7 (SD=1.2) in the 
diagnostic learning condition and 3.0 (SD=1.0) in the predictive learning condition. There 
were no significant differences between learning conditions. These results suggest that 
participants acquired the base rates of the diseases in all conditions but used them differently 
in probability ratings depending on the learning condition.  
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In summary, in Experiment 2 we used a triple M-structure as the learning material. In 
contrast to the single M-structure of Experiment 1, there was a difference in base rate use 
after diagnostic versus predictive learning. These results contradict the predictions of causal-
model theory, and support associative theories. A modified version of causal-model theory 
that assumes that learners may neglect information that does not seem crucial for successful 
performance may also account for the results (see General Discussion). 
An interesting result concerns the direct assessments of frequencies. Although 
frequencies were neglected in the diagnostic probability ratings after predictive learning, 
participants still encoded the frequencies of rare and frequent diseases equally well in both 
learning conditions. Thus, the found asymmetries of base rate use are not a result of a failure 
of encoding base rates after predictive learning. Since basic associative theories do not predict 
the encoding of frequencies, this finding requires more complex models. This finding is also 
critical for causal-model theory which anticipates storage of frequency information but does 
not predict that encoded frequency information may not be used in diagnostic inference tasks 
(see General Discussion).  
Experiment 3 
The results of Experiment 2 suggest that the asymmetry of base rate appreciation is 
particularly strong when probability assessments were requested, and less strong with the 
choice measure. A plausible explanation of this possible difference may be that the choice 
measure is sensitive to small differences and therefore does not differentiate between different 
sizes of sensitivity to base rates. One goal of Experiment 3 was to use a more sensitive 
measure of diagnostic inference that is based on choice, but is still better comparable with the 
probability measure. Our focus on choice was motivated by our goal to use a more implicit 
measure of base rate sensitivity than explicit frequency estimates. In general, in the present 
experiment we were interested in exploring whether our findings are restricted to explicit 
measures or can also be replicated with more implicit measures. When looking for a more 
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sensitive implicit task that is not based on explicit frequency estimates we tried to capitalize 
on the finding that learners tend to match probabilities when making blocks of diagnostic 
decisions (see Reber, 1993). Therefore, in the test phase all participants received several 
blocks of individual diagnostic trials without feedback. Our goal was to use the relative 
frequencies of the diagnoses of the frequent and the rare diseases given the ambiguous 
symptoms as an implicit indicator of participants’ probability estimates. Thus, different 
probabilities for the frequent and the rare diseases were taken as an implicit indicator of base 
rate sensitivity. 
Participants and Design 
There were 32 participants in this experiment who were randomly assigned to either the 
predictive or the diagnostic learning condition. They received either participation credit or 
DM 10. 
Method and Procedure 
The procedure remained largely unchanged from Experiment 2. Instead of the choice measure 
we used the new implicit probability measure. Again, participants sat in front of a computer 
screen, and were presented screen by screen with information about fictitious patients who 
had supposedly just been hospitalized. The procedure was self paced. Participants were either 
instructed to diagnose diseases or, in the predictive learning condition, to predict symptoms. 
Lists of symptoms and diseases were available throughout the experiment. In the learning 
phase we gave participants a minimum of four and a maximum of 16 blocks of 12 learning 
trials each, using a learning criterion of two completely correct blocks, in which they were 
presented with individual symptoms. In the test phase, participants saw single symptoms, and 
were requested to choose among the possible diseases as probable causes of the symptom. 
There were 48 test trials, presented in random order that presented individual symptoms. The 
frequencies of the individual symptoms mirrored two presentations of each of the three M-
structures. Thus, each ambiguous symptom was presented eight times, each frequent unique 
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symptom was presented six times, and each rare unique symptom was presented twice. 
Participants received no feedback in the test phase.  
The general procedure used in this experiment can be summarized as follows: (1) 
written general instruction, (2) computer instruction, (3) learning phase with feedback, (4) 
instruction for the test phase, (5) test phase of diagnostic judgments without feedback, (6) 
rating questionnaire, (7) frequency questionnaire. The same questionnaires were used as in 
Experiment 2. 
Results and Discussion 
One participant did not meet the learning criterion of two completely correct blocks so that 
this participant’s data were not included in the following statistical analyses. Generally, the 
results were similar to those from Experiment 2. The average means of the ratings of the 
probability of the high base rate diseases were 73% (SD=22) in the diagnostic learning 
condition and 62% (SD=22) in the predictive learning condition. For the low base rate 
diseases, participants in the diagnostic condition rated the probability on average at 46% 
(SD=31), while the respective value in the predictive learning condition turned out to be at 
58% (SD=13). On average (over all three M-structures), only six of the 16 participants in the 
diagnostic learning condition did not use base rates, in contrast to 12 out of 16 in the 
predictive learning condition. 
 As in the previous experiments, we conducted an ANOVA with the average difference 
between probability ratings for the two diseases in the ambiguous symptoms’ presence. 
Again, this explicit measure of base rate use yielded significant results, F(1, 29)=5.68, 
MSE=740.28, p<.05. This finding replicates the results of the previous experiment for the 
explicit measure of base rate use.  
 The novel question in the present study was whether the asymmetry of base rate use 
would also be found in a more implicit measure that was closer to the learning task. Figure 8 
shows the mean percentages of choices of the frequent diseases in the presence of the 
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ambiguous symptom: the high frequency disease was diagnosed in 70% of the trials in the 
diagnostic learning condition and in 58% in the predictive learning condition, whereas the low 
frequency disease was diagnosed in 20% in the diagnostic learning condition but in 41% in 
the predictive learning condition. Consequently, an analysis of variance with the average 
differences between percentages of choices for the two diseases in the ambiguous symptoms’ 
presence (i.e., implicit measure of base rate use) again revealed a significant difference 
between the causal conditions, F(1, 29)=5.96, MSE=1378.44, p<.05.  
Ratings of the frequencies of diseases once more turned out to be similar in both 
learning conditions, indicating no difference in the encoding of base rates. An analysis of 
variance on the differences between the average frequency ratings for the frequent diseases 
versus the rare diseases with the factor causal learning direction as the independent variable 
showed no statistically significant effect, F(1, 29)=1.46, MSE=1.15, n.s. The average means 
for differences were 3.4 (SD=1.1) in the diagnostic learning condition and 3.0 (SD=1.1) in the 
predictive learning condition. Again there were no significant differences between learning 
conditions. Figure 9 shows the average frequency ratings for the frequent and for the rare 
diseases separated by learning direction. 
In summary, the results from this experiment confirm and expand our earlier findings. 
As in Experiment 2 we used a triple M-structure as learning material. Again, there was a 
pronounced difference in base rate use after diagnostic but not after predictive learning in the 
diagnostic ratings. The interesting novel question whether this effect would also show up with 
a more implicit measure of base rate was answered as well. While we observed a certain use 
of the base rates in the predictive learning condition in the patterns of choices (see Fig. 8) we 
were also able to replicate the basic asymmetry between the causal learning conditions in 
complex tasks with the new measure. The use of base rates in the implicit measure is clearly 
less pronounced in the predictive learning condition than in the diagnostic learning condition. 
We also replicated the finding of Experiments 1 and 2 that participants encoded the 
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frequencies of the diseases fairly well in both learning conditions. This shows again that 
knowledge of base rates is not sufficient for using them in diagnostic judgments. 
General Discussion 
The three experiments present challenges for a unified account of causal learning. Experiment 
1 demonstrates that people incorporate base rate information in their diagnostic inference 
independent of the learning sequence in which the causal model was learned. However, when 
the complexity of the learning domain was increased in Experiments 2 and 3, performance 
deteriorated, especially when there was a mismatch between the learning sequence and the 
test sequence. Whereas learners were sensitive to the base rates of the causes in diagnostic test 
questions after diagnostic learning, they tended to neglect them after predictive learning. This 
asymmetry could be demonstrated in a probability rating task that required some abstraction 
from the learning task but was also prominent in a more implicit task in which participants 
matched the probability of the diseases in blocks of diagnostic judgments. Furthermore, it 
could be shown that this asymmetry is not due to a failure of encoding base rates in predictive 
learning. Participants generally remembered the frequency of the diseases fairly well in both 
learning conditions. In our view, these findings have theoretical as well as practical 
consequences. 
Theoretical Challenges 
The pattern of results in our experiments presents interesting challenges to extant theories. 
The competence of learners, displayed in Experiment 1, supports causal-model theory but 
presents problems for theories that model learning as solely directed from cues to outcomes 
(e.g., associative theories). These theories can explain base rate sensitivity after diagnostic 
learning, but, without an extension, are ill suited to model base rate sensitivity when learning 
proceeded in a direction opposite to the direction of the test questions (predictive learning and 
diagnostic testing).  
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 One possible explanation of the results of Experiment 1 is to retain the basic version of 
the Rescorla-Wagner theory but make the assumption that learning was pre-asymptotic. As 
pre-asymptotic weights should be smaller for the rare diseases than the frequent diseases this 
may explain base rate sensitivity in Experiment 1 even after predictive learning. However, a 
shortcoming of this approach is that it would also erroneously predict base rate sensitivity in 
predictive learning in Experiments 2 and 3. Moreover, we used a learning criterion in these 
experiments and fairly simple deterministic structures so that this account seems implausible.  
 A possible extension of the basic associative theory would be to propose a model that 
learns bidirectional links between cues and outcomes (Shanks & Lopez, 1996). Such a model 
could propose that people simultaneously learn in both directions which would predict base 
rate sensitivity in both tasks. Alternatively one could propose that learners acquire 
associations between outcomes (i.e., symptoms), or between outcomes and the context. The 
first proposal would lead to stronger associations between the ambiguous symptom and the 
frequent symptom rather than the rare symptom, the second to a stronger association between 
context and the frequent rather than the rare symptom.3 Through the associations between 
symptoms or the presence of the context in the test phase a preference for the more frequent 
disease given the ambiguous symptom could also be predicted. These extensions would again 
handle Experiment 1 but would then fail in Experiments 2 and 3, unless it is argued that the 
learning mechanism changes based on complexity. However, this seems to be an unusual 
theoretical move for a theory that generally tends to postulate a fixed basic learning 
mechanism which should not be affected by greater complexity (see Cobos et al., 2002). 
 In contrast, for Experiment 1 causal-model theory gives a straightforward account which 
postulates that people are capable of acquiring adequate causal model representations that 
contain information about causal structures and their parameters (including the base rate 
parameter)(see Gopnik et al., 2004; Glymour, 2001; Hagmayer, Sloman, Lagnado, & 
Waldmann, in press; Lagnado et al., in press; Waldmann & Hagmayer, 2005). Experiment 1 
    Base Rates in Causal Learning 
 
25 
provides the first demonstration that people have the competence to correctly learn about 
causal parameters irrespective of the experienced sequence of learning information when 
identical causal models are presented. Causal-model theory also anticipates storage of 
frequency information, which was found in all experiments. 
 Although the results of Experiment 1 favor causal-model theory, Experiments 2 and 3 
seem to be better predicted by standard associative theories. Basic associative theories predict 
base rate sensitivity after diagnostic learning, but not after predictive learning. However, 
strictly speaking the predictions of associative theories for our predictive-learning tasks 
require an extension. So far, associative theories have not been applied to learning tasks in 
which learning sequence and test sequence do not coincide. Under the assumption that 
learners transfer the associative weights from predictive learning to diagnostic testing these 
theories predict the asymmetry of base rate use, however. One aspect that presents difficulties 
for this class of theories is the fact that people still encoded base rate information even in the 
more complex tasks. A possible route for associative theories would be to postulate multiple 
systems, a frequency based learning system that is used for complex inferences (e.g., against 
the learning direction), and an associative system for basic tasks that require inferences in the 
cue-outcome direction (see Price & Yates, 1995, for such a proposal). However, this model 
does not predict the differences between Experiment 1 and Experiments 2 and 3. An 
alternative would be to postulate associative learning for complex tasks and restrict causal-
model learning to simpler domains (Cobos et al., 2002; Tangen & Allan, 2004). Although this 
theory is a theoretical possibility, a precise model that incorporates both learning components 
along with assumptions about the conditions that trigger the chosen learning strategy has yet 
to be developed (see also López, Cobos, & Caño, 2005). 
 Causal-model theory also needs to be extended to account for the results of Experiments 
2 and 3. Previous research with other tasks has already shown that the competence to form 
adequate causal representations may break down when the task surpasses the processing 
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limits of learners (De Houwer & Beckers, 2003; Reips, 1998; Waldmann & Walker, 2005). A 
plausible hypothesis accounting for performance deficits might postulate that learners 
confronted with complex tasks give up the goal to construct complete causal model 
representations that can be flexibly accessed. A complete causal model representation 
contains knowledge of causal structures and knowledge of the size of the parameters. Since 
structure knowledge is arguably more important than parameter knowledge, a plausible 
hypothesis is that learners are mainly interested in learning the structure of the causal models 
and only focus on the parameters they need for error free performance. For other parameters 
they might fill in default values or use default estimation strategies (Waldmann & Walker, 
2005). The results of Experiments 2 and 3 seem consistent with the notion that participants 
tend to choose a representation during learning that reduces errors (see also Lovett & Schunn, 
1999). Whereas the diagnostic learning task can only be mastered when base rates are taken 
into account at least implicitly, the predictive learning context permits error free performance 
without having to use base rate information. Thus, in the predictive learning condition a 
plausible prediction is that people default on the assumption of equal base rates. 
  In some respects this proposal is similar to the idea of postulating two learning 
mechanisms, a causal-model learning mechanism and an associative mechanism (Cobos et al., 
2002; López, Cobos, & Caño, 2005; Tangen & Allan, 2004). The basic difference is that the 
extended causal-model theory does not postulate two separate systems with different learning 
strategies but a unified learning mechanism that predicts that learners attempt to form causal 
model representations. Instead of postulating a second mechanism, the main hypothesis is that 
learners in complex tasks may neglect individual parameters of the causal models that seem 
less relevant for the present task. Such a model is more parsimonious than a multiple system 
account, and also has the advantage of postulating a unified probability learning mechanism 
instead of having to switch between associative and probability learning (see also Gopnik et 
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al., 2004; Waldmann & Martignon, 1998). However, at this point the data do not permit us to 
empirically decide between the competing accounts. 
 The finding that people encode base rates but do not always use them also poses a 
challenge for causal-model theory. A possible explanation is that people do not combine 
separately stored base rate information with causal strength information (as required by the 
Bayes inversion formula) but rely on direct estimates of conditional probabilities. More 
specifically, in the diagnostic task learners would primarily pick up probabilities (or 
frequencies) conditional on symptoms, whereas in the predictive task, probabilities would be 
learned conditional on diseases. Thus, as in the case of associative theories, base rates would 
be implicitly learned in the diagnostic task, as they are embodied in the probabilities of the 
diseases conditional upon the symptoms. Because base rates are implicitly embodied in the 
diagnostic conditional probabilities (see also Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995), the explicit 
storage of frequencies would be a side effect of probability learning. This would explain why 
frequencies can be stored but still be neglected in the conditional probability estimates. This 
finding also places constraints on causal-model theory’s account of the good performance in 
Experiment 1. Apparently learners need to be able to estimate conditional probabilities in both 
directions to arrive at adequate judgments. Simple knowledge of the base rates is probably not 
sufficient for good performance. 
 An interesting question for future research will be whether the competency to acquire 
flexibly accessible knowledge (as evidenced in Experiment 1) is based on the learning phase 
or on the retrieval phase. One possibility is that learners attempt to simultaneously learn 
knowledge in the predictive and diagnostic direction regardless of the learning task when the 
complexity of the task permits it. Another possibility is that the learners are capable of storing 
patterns of frequencies and co-occurrences in simple situations as in the present experiment 
with a single deterministic M-structure, and derive the necessary conditional probabilities 
from this knowledge base in the test phase (i.e., the retrieval stage). 
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 In summary, none of the competing theories is currently developed far enough to 
simultaneously account for the symmetries and asymmetries of base rate use in the three 
experiments. Hopefully future research will show which of the outlined theoretical 
possibilities is adequate. 
Practical consequences 
 Our research is of considerable practical significance for educational settings. It shows 
that the philosophy of many medical text books to present information organized around 
causes (see Thagard, 2000) may lead to deficits when this knowledge has to be used. Base 
rate neglect with verbally described materials has amply been documented. However, the 
present findings show that even feedback-based trial-by-trial learning and direct observations 
of frequency information are not immune to this error. Regardless of how our empirical 
findings will be theoretically explained, they provide important constraints for the selection of 
suitable learning and training contexts in education.  
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Footnotes 
1After the diagnostic ratings, which always were requested first, participants in some of the 
experiments were asked for their assessment of the predictive relationships (i.e., the 
probability of symptoms given the individual diseases). Since these data are of little 
theoretical significance in the present context we will not discuss these results here. 
 
2We have also conducted an experiment with two M-structures (4 diseases, 6 symptoms), 
which will not be reported here because the results are very similar to the results of the 
present Experiments 2 and 3. 
 
3These theoretical possibilities were suggested by M. Buehner and M. Vadillo. 
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List of Figure Captions 
Figure 1. The same causal structure can either be learned from causes to effects or from 
effects to causes. 
Figure 2. Predictive versus diagnostic learning of a single M-structure with a frequent and a 
rare cause. The disease pleroia is three times as frequent as the disease spetitis, shortness of 
breath (ambiguous symptom) is caused by both diseases. Unique symptoms are caused by 
only one of the diseases. 
Figure 3. Schematic description of the learning task. The final test requests access to the 
diagnostic direction. 
Figure 4. Mean probability ratings for the frequent and rare diseases in the presence of the 
ambiguous symptom in Experiment 1 (single M-structure). Data labels show differences of 
ratings between frequent and rare diseases given the ambiguous symptom. 
Figure 5. Mean estimates of frequencies of frequent and rare diseases after diagnostic and 
predictive learning in Experiment 1 (single M-structure). Data labels show differences of 
estimates between frequent and rare diseases given the ambiguous symptom. 
Figure 6. Mean probability ratings for the frequent and rare diseases in the presence of the 
ambiguous symptoms in Experiment 2 (triple M-structure).  
Figure 7. Mean estimates of frequencies of frequent and rare diseases after diagnostic and 
predictive learning in Experiment 2 (triple M-structure). 
Figure 8. Percent of diagnoses of frequent and rare diseases causing the ambiguous symptoms 
(i.e., implicit test of base rate use) in Experiment 3 (triple M-structure). Data labels show 
differences of percentages. 
Figure 9. Mean estimates of frequencies of frequent and rare diseases after diagnostic and 
predictive learning in Experiment 3 (triple M-structure).  
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